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Negotiating Psycho-Emotional Dimensions of Disability and 
their Influence on Identity Constructions 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses Foucault’s concept of ‘technologies of power’ to explore the 
ways in which the psycho-emotional dimensions of disability are created and 
maintained within society. The manner in which gaze and self-surveillance 
operate on the bodies of people with impairments to leave them feeling 
worthless, unattractive and stressed is considered and the effects of impairment 
on these processes are also discussed. However disabled people are not simply 
passive victims of this form of emotional disablism – many exercise agency and 
resist. The manner in which disabled people resist the negative stereotypes is 
described and the process of ‘coming out’ as a disabled person is offered as an 
example of a ‘technology of the self’. This interplay of dominating and 
emancipatory forces is shown to contribute to a disability identity which is fluid 
and which better represents the diversity of the disability experiences of disabled 
people than an essentialist disability identity.  
 
Introduction 
Disability theory owes much to Marxism, feminism and postmodernism, although 
at times these different perspectives also threaten to destroy this relatively new 
discipline (Corker 1999b). Many of the debates centre around interpretations of 
the social model of disability. Recently, in response to some of these criticisms, 
Thomas (1999a) proposed an extended social relational understanding of 
disability to include both structural and psycho-emotional dimensions of disability. 
This latter form of disablism undermines the emotional well-being of disabled 
people and can be just as disabling as structural barriers. Discussions about the 
psychological effects of exclusion, discrimination and prejudice are important 
because  
 
‘[d]ealing with anger, self-loathing, and daily experiences of rejection and 
humiliation are among the hardest aspects of being a disabled person’ 
(Shakespeare, et al. 1996: 42-43). 
 
At the same time as disability studies appears to be removing the body from  
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sociological analysis, sociology has rediscovered the body (Hughes and 
Paterson 1997). Foucault can be described as one of the most significant 
theorists of the body, in how it has been constituted with respect to power rather 
than in biological terms (Fox 1993). However, despite the importance of 
Foucault’s work within contemporary social theory, the use of his ideas within 
disability studies is relatively scarce (Hughes and Paterson 1997). Over the last 
few years Foucauldian concepts have been applied within this discipline to 
theorise a sociology of impairment (Hughes 1999; Hughes and Paterson 1997) 
and to attempt to challenge the disability/impairment and disabled/able-bodied 
dichotomies (Corker and French 1999a; Price and Shildrick 1998). In addition 
Foucault’s work has been drawn upon to understand the experiences of children 
with Special Educational Needs (Allan 1996) and the ways in which discourses 
grounded in the medical model affect the services disabled people receive 
(Chadwick 1996; McIntosh 2002; Sullivan and Munford 1998). It is my intention 
to extend the use of Foucauldian concepts within disability studies to include a 
discussion of the psycho-emotional dimensions of disability, building on the 
existing literature which focuses mainly on the structural dimensions of disability. 
 
In this paper I will use the Foucauldian themes of power, knowledge and 
subjectivity to explore the ways in which the psycho-emotional dimensions of 
disability are created and maintained within society and how in turn these are 
challenged by disabled people. In particular I will be considering the effects of 
different forms of power/knowledge acting on the impaired body. The experience 
of psycho-emotional disablism is not inevitable because disabled people can 
resist the technologies of power imposed from above and may also transform 
themselves by ‘coming out’ as a disabled person – reclaiming disability as a 
positive identity. Finally I draw on my discussions of the psycho-emotional 
dimensions of disability to show how this form of disability contributes to a 
disability identity which is fluid and diverse.  
 
An exploration of the psycho-emotional dimensions of disability is long overdue. 
This form of disablism saps the strength of disabled people, and in the absence 
of any structural disability within society, would still prevent them from being the 
people they have the potential to be. Understanding this important area of 
disability is not just about self-preservation, it also exposes the power relations 
between disabled and non-disabled people (Keith 1996).  
 
Psycho-emotional dimensions of disability 
The social model of disability posits disability as being caused by ‘externally 
imposed disadvantage and social restriction’ (Oliver and Barnes 1998: 18) rather 
than impairment. This shift to make disability a social, rather than individual 
problem has been a vital part of the move towards the emancipation of disabled 
people within society. However this definition of disability has been criticised for 
failing to acknowledge the role played by impairment and illness in the life 
experiences of disabled people (Crow 1996; French 1993; Morris 1991) and for 
placing  
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too much emphasis on socio-structural barriers, thereby ignoring the cultural and 
experiential dimensions of disability (Shakespeare 1994).  
 
Another criticism of the social model of disability is that the focus has been on 
the ‘public’ experiences of oppression such as social barriers, at the expense of 
the more ‘personal’ experiences of oppression which operate at the emotional 
level (Thomas 1999a). In addition to the socio-structural barriers and restrictions 
which exclude and discriminate against disabled people, Thomas (1999a) 
suggests that the social model of disability should be extended to include social 
processes and practices which undermine the emotional well-being of people 
with impairments. These psycho-emotional dimensions of disability which affect 
what disabled people can be, rather than what they can do, include being hurt by 
the reactions of other people, being made to feel worthless and unattractive and 
have their roots in the negative attitudes and prejudices about disabled people 
within society.  
 
There are various manifestations of the psycho-emotional dimensions of 
disability. One important aspect includes the way in which disabled people 
respond emotionally to social exclusion and physical barriers (structural 
disability), such as feelings of anger and frustration when faced with inaccessible 
buildings. Another dimension of this form of disability includes the emotional 
responses to the social reactions of other people, for example, feeling ashamed 
when being stared at in the street. An important element of this type of emotional 
disablism is called internalised oppression and is a feature of any marginalised 
group within society. It can be described as the: 
 
'incorporation and acceptance by individuals within an oppressed group of 
the prejudices against them within the dominant society … [and] the 
mechanism within an oppressive system for perpetuating domination not 
only by external control but also by building subservience in to the minds 
of the oppressed groups' (Pheterson 1986: 148).  
 
One example of internalised oppression is when a disabled person believes that 
they do not have the right to be a sexual being, having internalised the prejudice 
that disabled people are asexual (Morris 1991). 
 
The personal psychological effects of internalised oppression experienced by 
disabled people have been described graphically, for example, 
 
‘We harbour inside ourselves the pain and the memories, the fears and the 
confusions, the negative self-images and the low expectations, turning them into 
weapons with which to re-injure ourselves, every day of our lives’ (Mason 1992: 
27). 
 
Psychoanalysis, in the form of object relations theory, explains internalised 
oppression as the projection of the disavowed parts of non-disabled people onto 
disabled people who are constituted as Other (Shakespeare 1994). Whilst this 
explanation implies that internalised oppression is an inevitable experience for all 
disabled people, I do not believe that all disabled people experience the same 
levels of internalised oppression because they are not a homogenous group. 
Woolley (1991) described how the experience of oppression and internalised 
oppression was  
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different for someone like herself who became deaf, as opposed to someone 
who was born deaf into the Deaf community. There is also anthropological 
evidence of some societies in which people with impairments were not rejected 
or excluded (Barnes 1997). 
 
Despite the prevalence of negative stereotypes of disability within all aspects of 
society and the damaging effects internalised oppression has on the everyday 
life of disabled people, this phenomenon remains a currently neglected area of 
discussion within disability studies (Marks 1999). Part of the reason for this 
neglect is that psychology has been criticised for pathologising disability (Oliver 
1990) and psychoanalysis has been rejected for being based within a medical 
model approach to disability – thus aspects of the experience of disabled people 
which affect their emotional well-being have been ignored. However the 
extension of the social relational understanding of disability to include both 
structural and psycho-emotional dimensions of disability provided by Thomas 
(1999a) offers a way of opening up discussion about internalised oppression and 
other emotional experiences linked to the experience of disability. 
 
For the remainder of this paper I will contribute to this discussion about the 
psycho-emotional dimensions of disability by applying Foucauldian perspectives 
to this form of disablism. Internalised oppression relies on disabled people 
internalising the prejudices and stereotypes held by a non-disabled majority; this 
relates nicely to a Foucauldian analysis of the ways in which ‘regimes of truth’ 
about disabled bodies affect their governance and control. As the corporeal body 
is inseparable from the power inscribed on it, considering the nature of the lived 
body/impairment exposes the embodied experience of prejudice, oppression and 
discrimination (Hughes and Paterson 1997), or in other words, the experience of 
the psycho-emotional dimensions of disability.  
 
As well as identifying particular ‘technologies of power’ which underpin some of 
this emotional form of disablism, I will also consider how Foucault’s concept of 
the more creative ‘technologies of the self’ can reveal the ways in which disabled 
people can resist and challenge the psycho-emotional dimensions of disability. 
Finally I will discuss the ways in which ‘subjectivity’ can be linked to the 
experiences of this psycho-emotional form of disablism and how this relates to 
the identity of disabled people. However, I will first provide a brief description of 
some of the fundamental Foucauldian concepts I will be using throughout this 
paper. 
 
Foucault – themes of power, knowledge and subjectivity  
Foucault provided a definition of power which was in direct contrast to that used 
within traditional concepts of capitalism. Instead of monolithic control or power 
being held by a clearly defined group within society, he instead described power 
as being induced in the body and produced within every human relationship with 
‘relations of power’ being the key point (Foucault 2000a). Power is never 
localised in the hands of one person but instead permeates throughout with 
individuals being the 'vehicles of power, not its points of application' (Foucault 
1980b: 98). 
 
Foucault’s historical analysis of the shift from sovereign power to a more  
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pervasive disciplinary power highlights its productive, constitutive nature 
(Williams and Bendelow 1999). Disciplinary power classifies and documents 
individuals and places them under continuous forms of surveillance; this power 
turns its subjects into objects of power/knowledge (Foucault 1977). Power and 
knowledge are intimately interlinked – it is not possible to have one without the 
other (Foucault 1980a). In addition the concept of power/knowledge was 
developed by Foucault to illustrate how knowledge is what makes people 
subjects because they make sense of themselves (and others) by referring back 
to various bodies of knowledge (Danaher, et al. 2000: 50).  
 
The use of disciplinary power to render a body docile, and therefore productive 
and economically useful, entails the creation of procedures of normalisation 
against which to monitor that body. Foucault showed that medicine and 
psychoanalysis, in addition to the penal system, provided examples of 
disciplinary and regulatory controls leading to the creation of new norms 
(Foucault 1971; 1976). This diffusion of the medical discourse has enabled the 
medical model view of disability to become widespread at all levels of society, 
affecting the manner in which institutions from the government to industry treat 
disabled people (Chadwick 1996). The widespread institutional use of this 
particular model of disability makes it almost immune to challenge as seen in the 
Disability Discrimination Act (1995) which uses a definition of disability based on 
the medical, rather than social model of disability. 
 
A Foucauldian concept of power is not only negative, resulting in prohibition and 
exclusion; the most important product to be created from power is resistance to 
that power and Foucault believed that if there were no resistance, then there 
would be no power relations (Foucault 2000a). A major criticism of Foucault's 
work has been the inability to satisfactorily explain resistance (Williams and 
Bendelow 1999). In his earlier works Foucault appears to provide a rather 
pessimistic view about the possibility of radical resistance and it was only in his 
later works that the role of individual agency was included in his concepts of the 
‘technologies of the self’; these internalised procedures  
 
'permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, 
a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to 
attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or 
immortality' (Foucault 2000b: 225).  
 
The technologies of the self have a potential for emancipatory action because of 
the individual's capacity for autonomy, reflexivity and critique (McNay 1992). The 
technologies of the self also aimed to overcome some of the more negative 
connotations of disciplinary power and docile bodies which implied that people 
were completely dominated by and subject to power (Williams and Bendelow 
1999). However Foucault also admitted that these technologies of the self were 
not as liberating as the above poetic quote would imply (Foucault 2000a); such a 
creation of the self is also subject to restrictions imposed by culture and other 
people within society.  
 
Related to power and knowledge is the final theme of subjectivity, which is used  
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to explain identity, or the self. Subjectivity is not a static characteristic; it is 
created by the ever-changing interaction of discourses, institutions and relations 
(Danaher, et al. 2000). As the construction of subjectivity is through 
power/knowledge, people are formed as subjects from above by technologies of 
power, but this is modified by the ways in which individuals oppose these 
relations of power (resist) or transform themselves (technologies of the self) 
(Foucault 2000b). Subjectivity is also dependent on the context – people 
constitute themselves as different subjects depending on whether they are going 
to vote or are seeking a sexual relationship with a partner (Foucault 2000a: 290). 
Therefore subjectivity is a fluid identity, affected by time and place, culture and 
society. 
 
Technologies of power exposed within the psycho-emotional dimensions 
of disability 
The Foucauldian themes of power, knowledge and subjectivity are interlinked 
and I will now consider how two technologies of power which regulate the body – 
gaze and self-surveillance – can illuminate the processes behind psycho-




Through this technology of power, the object of the gaze becomes known to the 
viewer and the observer gains expertise and control over those being gazed at. 
This can be seen in institutional settings where bodies are disciplined – 
medicine, psychiatry, law, education and social work (Fox 1993). For disabled 
people, the body truly has become a site of power/knowledge under the 
surveillance of medical experts who use the clinical gaze to identify deviance and 
disorder and to constitute the subject as a patient (Fox 1993). The phenomenon 
known as ‘public stripping’ (French 1994b: 104) is a direct form of the clinical 
gaze which leaves the recipient feeling vulnerable, exposed and humiliated and 
is an example of a psycho-emotional form of disability as well as a form of 
institutional abuse. 
 
Whilst medicalisation has improved, and even saved the lives of many disabled 
people who would have died a century ago (such as people with spinal cord 
injury Oliver, et al. 1988), there is a darker side to the gaze of medicine. Medical 
techniques increasingly penetrate and inscribe the body, from X-rays to foetal 
screening; at the same time medicine has become a political enterprise with 
decisions about treatment being affected by finances and government election 
promises. Good examples of this bio-power are the ways in which foetuses with 
a perceived impairment are regularly terminated (Bailey 1996) and the recent 
outcry over the use of Do Not Resuscitate notices on elderly and disabled people 
in hospitals (Wood 2000). Underpinning these practices are prejudices about the 
worth and value of disabled people’s lives, that these are lives not worth living 
(Morris 1991), which in turn leave disabled people feeling rejected and worthless. 
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The gaze also exerts power over disabled people within everyday social 
interactions. 
 
'We often experience the fascination that non-disabled people have with 
‘just how do you manage?’ They have a consuming curiosity about how 
we pee, how we shit, how we have sex (do we have sex?) … Our physical 
difference makes our bodies public property' (Morris 1991: 29; emphasis 
in original). 
 
Having an impairment which is immediately visible presents the observer with 
privileged information and therefore power, about that body. This gaze is 
influenced by the stereotypes and prejudices about disabled people and so the 
power of the gaze is intimately linked and nourished by knowledge from within 
the social domain. Keith (1996) describes how people's reactions to her are 
informed by the wheelchair she uses; their assumptions about what it means to 
be a wheelchair user are so negative and different to how Keith sees herself, that 
she feels she needs to have ways of dealing with and understanding these 
encounters or 'they have the power to destroy me' (Keith 1996: 71).  
 
Whilst acknowledging that the ways in which disabled people respond to the 
gaze of others vary and are affected by personal biographies and experience, 
nonetheless the disciplining power of the gaze can leave disabled people feeling 
ashamed, vulnerable and invalidated, and contributes to the psycho-emotional 
dimensions of disability. This particular form of disablism can prevent disabled 
people participating within society as much as the presence of structural barriers: 
 
‘It is not only physical limitations that restrict us to our homes and those 
whom we know. It is the knowledge that each entry into the public world 
will be dominated by stares, by condescension, by pity and by hostility’ 
(Morris 1991: 25). 
 
Because the power of the gaze arises from what can be seen by the observer, 
the experience of this form of disablism is affected by the visibility of impairment 
and impairment effects. Someone who cannot hide their impairment is exposed 
to the assumptions of others and their impairment often becomes their most 
significant personal attribute (French 1994a). On the other hand, someone with a 
hidden impairment is less subject to the power of the gaze and hence what 
others know about them; however, within the act of passing remains the fear of 
being discovered – ‘the negative psycho-emotional aspects of concealment’ 
(Thomas 1999a: 55). In addition, people with hidden impairments may attract 
hostility from others whilst using facilities provided for disabled people; for 
example when parking in a space reserved for disabled drivers. 
 
Before considering some of the ways in which disabled people can resist the 
oppressive gaze of others I will explore a related technology of power, that of 
self-surveillance. 
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Self-surveillance 
The concept of self-surveillance developed out of the Panopticon, which was an 
ideal prison in which each isolated inmate lived knowingly under the continual 
inspection from the all-seeing, but anonymous eyes of the guard (Foucault 
1977). This experience of living in permanent potential visibility led to the inmate 
internalising the scrutinising gaze, effectively and efficiently becoming self-
policing. This process of self-surveillance is not restricted to institutions such as 
the prison or asylum, it exists throughout society, operating as a 'series of 
mechanisms for unbalancing power relations definitely and everywhere' 
(Foucault 1977: 223). Self-surveillance is therefore linked to the gaze – people 
develop an awareness of how they are seen through the gaze of another and 
then modify their behaviour via self-surveillance to attempt to make themselves 
acceptable. There are several different forms of self-surveillance which affect the 
psycho-emotional well-being of disabled people.  
 
Self-surveillance of the physical body affects both disabled and non-disabled 
people. The terms ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ have become markers of moral 
worth, with people who do not look after their health being considered 
irresponsible and lacking self-control (Petersen 1997). As part of the 
rehabilitation process within spinal injury units, people with spinal cord injury are 
taught the principles of good bowel management and instructed how to check 
their bodies daily for signs of abrasion or pressure sores. Whilst I acknowledge 
that this returns autonomy to the disabled person for care of the self, literally to 
become a 'doctor of oneself' (Foucault 2000b: 235), failure to maintain an 
adequate level of self-care is considered by others to be irresponsible. From 
personal experience, it seems to me that the (usually) non-disabled people who 
criticise my failure to adhere to apparently simple self-surveillance tasks fail to 
appreciate the emotional costs of having to carry out tasks which they do not 
have to do themselves. These tasks are yet another reminder of my ‘abnormality’ 
and I am held responsible for failing to contain and render invisible that 
difference from the norm. I would consider that this form of self-surveillance of 
the body for some disabled people has an adverse effect on their emotional well-
being. 
 
Another use of self-surveillance is in the creation of disabled bodies when 
claiming benefit (Shildrick 1997). Disability Living Allowance (DLA) provides 
money for helping disabled people with their mobility and personal care needs. In 
the modern welfare state self-certification has replaced the traditional 
interview/assessment procedure. Rather than being under the gaze of the 
interviewer, the claimant is required to critically gaze upon their own body and 
report in detail how it fails to meet the ‘norm’; in so doing, the claimant is creating 
themselves as disabled. Additionally it has been found that the chances of a 
successful DLA application are increased if a knowledgeable advocate 
completes the form, using particular forms of language which are recognised by 
the government agency (Daly and Noble 1996) – the self-surveillance of the 
body is constrained by how others describe disability. In a similar manner the 
applicant for Incapacity Benefit has to produce the incapable body and identify 
themselves as a disabled person incapable  
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of work (Price and Shildrick 1998). The cost to the claimant of accepting these 
disability benefits is that they are forced to adopt the negative identity of a 
disabled person, someone who is abnormal and incapable; for many the 
emotional cost is too high and instead they prefer to manage without the financial 
benefits provided by the state. 
 
The final example of self-surveillance I want to consider is that of internalised 
oppression – the ways in which disabled people internalise the prejudices and 
assumptions held by non-disabled people about them - which was described 
previously. In this form of self-surveillance disabled people may attempt to make 
themselves acceptable by conforming to the behaviour expected by non-disabled 
people and to adopt the ‘disabled role’ – being totally independent, ‘normal’, 
adjusted to their situation and taking full responsibility for managing social 
interactions (French 1994c: 48-56). By adopting this disabled role, disabled 
people become what they have internalised and the erroneous beliefs and 
attitudes about disabled people are never challenged (French 1994c). 
Unfortunately the disabled role can also be a contradictory one - whilst disabled 
people are perceived as being helpless, child-like and dependent, they are also 
seen as something to be feared and avoided (Evans 1992). Living a 
contradictory identity has a detrimental effect on the psycho-emotional well-being 
of a disabled person, causing stress and confusion, and in part, this conflicting 
identity remains unchallenged because of the lack of positive role models within 
society for disabled people. This particular form of self-surveillance, which 
usually operates at the unconscious level, is very difficult for individuals to 
identify and challenge. 
 
Gaze and self-surveillance operate within the psycho-emotional dimensions of 
disability, a form of disablism that leaves disabled people feeling excluded, 
worthless, unattractive and stressed (Thomas 1999a). Although the practices 
and stereotypes which underpin this form of disablism are endemic within 
society, not all disabled people are passive recipients of this form of disability - 
many exercise agency and resist.  
 
Challenging the psycho-emotional dimensions of disability 
Whilst gaze and self-surveillance are powerful forces which disable people with 
impairments, this form of disablism is not inevitable. Disabled people have been 
challenging these technologies of power and I will now discuss how these 
challenges can be related to the Foucauldian concepts of resistance and the 
related technologies of the self. 
 
Resistance 
As defined earlier, resistance emerges out of, and in opposition to power. Whilst 
this resistance may be radical, it is usually more localised and specific, mobilising 
people in different ways (Foucault 1981). One important example of resistance 
within the disabled people’s movement has been the challenge of prevailing 
medical discourses about disability by the creation of the social model of 
disability.  
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‘The gaze is deflected, by disabled people, from impaired bodies to the 
social body which, hitherto a model of innocence, is now identified as the 
source of the disorder’ (Hughes 1999: 159).  
 
Another very obvious example is that provided by the activities of the Direct 
Action Network, disabled activists who use demonstrations to bring issues 
affecting disabled people, such as inaccessible transport, to the attention of the 
media and the general public (Campbell and Oliver 1996). Language has also 
been challenged by the use of the term 'non-disabled' instead of 'able-bodied', as 
a way of disrupting the stigma of disability and removing disabled people from 
the status of Other; how effective this challenge has been is debatable because 
the unequal power relations remain in place (Price and Shildrick 1998).  
 
Whilst disciplinary power creates certain normalising practices which can be 
internalised as forms of self-surveillance, these very practices may result in 
resistance (Shildrick 1997). A good example of this is the way that disabled 
parents challenge the categories of parenting and caring (Keith and Morris 
1996). The 'children as carers' stories which frequently appear in the media 
present the impression that children are parenting their parents. These stories 
ignore the reality about the wide variety of ways which disabled parents look 
after the emotional and physical needs of their children. Research on families 
with disabled parents has shown that it is usually lack of services and financial 
support which forces parents to rely on family members for support (Parker 
1993). This research has also provided alternative understandings of what it 
means to be a parent or to care for someone, thereby challenging the hegemonic 
views of parenting and caring.  
 
Resistance is also seen in the ways that disabled people are challenging the 
prevailing notions of beauty and physical perfection. The style magazine Dazed 
and Confused featured a group of disabled people modelling clothes designed 
by Alexander McQueen (Dazed and Confused 1998). In these pictures 
impairments were clearly visible and in several cases were an important part of 
the image; one model was a woman born without limbs modelling nude under 
coloured lights to resemble the Venus de Milo, a Greek sculpture of the perfect 
female body. This example shows disabled people returning the gaze back onto 
the reader – they refuse to be ashamed of revealing their impaired bodies. These 
images of disabled models are a far cry from the more usual modelling of 
mobility and incontinence aids. 
 
Technologies of the self 
Whilst resistance is a reaction to power, technologies of the self are about self-
transformation and reflect an active, rather than a passive subject. There is 
obviously an overlap between these two terms because in many respects the 
disabled people who modelled in Dazed and Confused were resisting the norms 
about which bodies (tall, slim, non-disabled) feature in a style magazine at the 
same time as creating themselves as sexual, attractive people. As mentioned 
earlier, technologies of the self are not purely under the control of the individual – 
cultural representations of disability together with the prejudices and attitudes of 
other people place restrictions  
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on how far disabled people can transform themselves (Shakespeare 1994). Also 
it may be particularly difficult for disabled people to transform themselves given 
the very real physical effects and adverse consequences of ageing, sickness, 
disability and death (Williams and Bendelow 1999).  
 
One example of a technology of the self are the ways in which disabled people 
can challenge their own internalised medical model of disability (Chadwick 1996). 
One set of responses to the negative stereotypes of disabled people involves 
denial where someone with an impairment will attempt to pass or be a 
‘supercrip’, someone who is more than ‘normal’ (Shakespeare 1996). An 
alternative to this denial approach is to 'come out' as a disabled person, to claim 
the label in a positive manner through disability pride and to become part of a 
disability movement which offers a political and collective experience of disability 
(Shakespeare 1996). Coming out as a disabled person entails replacing the 
dominant medical model public narrative about disability with a social model 
narrative, as well as overcoming internalised oppression (Shakespeare, et al. 
1996); this process of self-identification can be both liberating and emotionally 
painful (Thomas 1999b). However as discussed earlier, resisting by taking part in 
disability arts or politics means that the person has accepted a disabled identity 
which is not always trouble-free to adopt (Liggett 1988).  
 
Challenges to the psycho-emotional (and structural) dimensions of disability have 
increased since the emergence of a disability movement and the social model of 
disability. A disability culture has grown which produces new disability narratives 
and brings disabled people together – opportunities to create a new disability 
identity (Shakespeare 1996). Technologies of power can create and maintain 
psycho-emotional disability and this form of disablism can be challenged through 
resistance and the self-transformation process of coming out as a disabled 
person. I will now explore the link between the experience of psycho-emotional 
disablism and disability identities drawing on Foucault’s concept of subjectivity 
described earlier. 
 
Disability identities – a discussion 
Subjectivity was a term used by Foucault to describe the manner in which 
identity emerges from the interactions of discourses, ideologies and institutional 
practices rather than being a product of the self-governing conscious self 
(Danaher, et al. 2000). Thus the interplay of the different relations of power 
described previously together with current economic and socio-cultural 
processes are responsible for shaping a disability identity (Foucault 2000a).  
 
Does a single disabled identity exist? Shakespeare (1996) considers this issue at 
length and concludes that in addition to the dangers associated with seeing 
disability as the primary identity of someone with an impairment (and ignoring 
their counter-identities such as gender, ethnicity, sexuality and age), it may also 
be necessary to consider a variety of disability identities, rather than a single 
essentialist disability identity. The concept of a single disability identity is 
appealing – disabled people linked by a shared experience of oppression and 
social exclusion – and as in other identity politics, it has political use as a rallying 
call to effect social change. However  
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not all disabled people experience the same degrees of disabling barriers and 
discrimination: class, age, sexuality, gender and ethnic grouping affect the 
consequences of impairment and hence the social and economic experience of 
disability (Shakespeare 1996). The experience of structural disability is also 
affected by impairment; people with visual impairments will have different 
experiences of disability to those with mobility impairments (Shakespeare 1993).  
 
Foucault warned against the dangers of privileging one form of identity over 
another (McNay 1992) and I believe that benefit would be gained from 
considering disability identity as multi-faceted and fluid, rather than a fixed 
concept. Throughout this paper I have shown how the psycho-emotional 
dimensions of disability are created and challenged by different technologies of 
power which operate from above and below. The relative strengths of these 
dominating and emancipatory forces are affected by personal experience, 
counter-identities as well as impairment; and like subjectivity, the daily 
experiences of the psycho-emotional dimensions of disability change according 
to the context disabled people find themselves in.  
 
Thus, disability identities in part emerge from the experience of the psycho-
emotional dimensions of disability because of the construction of subjectivity 
from the interplay of technologies of power with resistance and technologies of 
the self. This experience of psycho-emotional disablism is interlinked with the 
experience of living with impairment effects (Thomas 1999a) and I have indicated 
some of the ways that impairment affects the psycho-emotional dimensions of 
disability, such as the manner in which the experience of the gaze is affected by 
the extent to which an impairment is visible or can be hidden. Therefore disability 
identity is a function of both disability and impairment experiences; it will be 
constituted differently for each individual and will have both temporal and spatial 
dimensions. 
 
One of the reasons why people with impairments do not always identify with the 
disabled people’s movement is because of the apparent downplaying of the role 
of impairment (Shakespeare 1993). Thomas (forthcoming) suggests that 
acknowledging the personal experiences of living with impairment and disability 
is politically unifying rather than divisive because it enables recognition of the 
range of disability experiences and how these are mediated by impairment and 
other intersecting identities such as gender and age. A social model of disability 
which includes both the structural and psycho-emotional dimensions of disability 
has much to offer the disabled people’s movement because it acknowledges the 
personal experience of living with disability and impairment from a social, rather 
than individual theoretical standpoint. A fluid model of disability identity that 
acknowledges the personal experiences of disability and impairment supports 
this approach. In turn, this will make the disabled people’s movement more 
relevant to people with impairments who do not currently identify as disabled. 
 
Conclusions 
The Foucauldian concepts of technologies of power, resistance and technologies 
of the self offer some insight into the psycho-emotional dimensions of disability 
and the manner in which they might be created, maintained and challenged. I 
have  
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shown how gaze and self-surveillance are particularly powerful for describing the 
manner in which the bodies of disabled people are controlled and how this 
affects the emotional well-being of these people. However this control is not 
complete; disabled people can (sometimes) resist these particular technologies 
of power as well as transform themselves to generate different selves.  
 
Like the differing experiences of structural disability, not all disabled people 
experience the same degrees of psycho-emotional disablism – personal 
biography, intersecting identities, impairment and context change the daily 
experiences of this form of disability. I am not saying that impairment causes 
structural or psycho-emotional dimensions of disability but rather that people with 
differing impairments will experience different consequences from these two 
different types of oppression.  
 
The linking together of impairment and the psycho-emotional dimensions of 
disability is related to recent debates within disability studies about the dichotomy 
between disability and impairment. Corker and French (1999b) believe that 
disability and impairment are discursively related and so it is impossible to talk 
about the real experience of disability oppression whilst disability and impairment 
remain separated. Within everyday life, disabled people often describe a 
complex existence which occupies the space between disability and normality, 
health and illness which is not reflected in a disability studies approach which 
maintains the dichotomy and ignores this rich area between (Corker 1999a). 
Therefore I suspect that this interstitial area could offer valuable insight into the 
nature of psycho-emotional dimensions of disability experienced by disabled 
people.   
 
Given that the disabled people’s movement does not currently represent the full 
range of people with impairments (Shakespeare 1993), it may be appropriate to 
move away from the idea of a single, fixed disability identity. Disability identity 
needs to include aspects of both disability and impairment and to be more 
complex and inclusive if it is to better represent all disabled people in society. 
The psycho-emotional dimensions of disability underpin the concept of a fluid 
disability identity, an identity which is not fixed in time or place and which varies 
between disabled people. Resisting the psycho-emotional dimensions of 
disability and ‘coming out’ as a disabled person challenge the conventional 
denigrated disabled identities and are a form of individual political action.  
 
‘Relentless refusals to go along with what appears to come naturally are 
front-line battles in the politics of disability’ (Liggett 1988: 274).  
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